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“Too Big To Fail” States 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA 
 This Essay explores the constitutional implications of a threatened 
default by a large state.  Much like the huge financial institutions that 
became distressed in 2008, a large state might well be deemed too big to 
fail.  If that kind of state seeks a federal bailout, it would hold most of the 
cards in any negotiation because Congress lacks the power to compel a 
state to pay its debts.  After outlining this hold-up issue, the Essay 
concludes by assessing some possible responses by Congress, such as 
invoking the Guarantee Clause or imposing future fiscal penalties under 
the Spending Clause. 
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“Too Big To Fail” States 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the financial system was brought to the brink of collapse by 
the debts of institutions that were deemed “too big to fail.”1  While many 
of these firms were reckless and deserved to go under, their bankruptcies 
would have triggered a cascade of defaults with dreadful consequences.  
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve negotiated to save these troubled 
lenders on an ad hoc basis because no clear rules were in place on how to 
address the problem.2  In 2010, Congress responded by creating a 
framework for the regulation and the orderly liquidation of private 
institutions that are seen as too big to fail.3 
Unfortunately, there was a significant omission from this reform that 
could precipitate a future economic and constitutional meltdown—state 
governments.4  Some of our largest states, most notably California, face 
crushing debt burdens due to the severity of the Great Recession and their 
own poor governance.5  If one of these states were to default on its bonds, 
then the contagion effect on other states, investment banks, and pension 
funds could be similar to what resulted from the disappearance of Lehman 
Brothers three years ago.6  Worse still, an irresponsible state is in a 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Indiana University—Indianapolis.  I want to thank the organizers of the  
Symposium for inviting me to participate.   
1 See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND 
THEMSELVES (2009) (providing an in depth account of the financial panic). 
2 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response 
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 465, 468 (2009) (noting that the bailout package—or 
lack thereof—given to each firm during the panic was different and hammered out under duress). 
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111−203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010). 
4 For an essay that advocates amending the federal bankruptcy code to include states, see David 
Skeel, Give States a Way To Go Bankrupt, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2010, at 22.  I am sympathetic 
to this proposal, but I doubt that Congress will do anything about this until there is another crisis.  
5 See Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting Debts by States Stoke Fears of Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1 (“Not just small towns or dying Rust Belt cities, but also large states 
like Illinois and California are increasingly at risk.”).  This Essay will not go into detail about the state 
constitutional flaws that are contributing to these deficits.  It is worth noting that California voters 
recently approved Proposition 25, which allows a majority in each legislative chamber to enact the 
budget instead of the two-thirds that was required previously.  Wyatt Buchanan & Justin Berton, Prop. 
25, Fiscal Initiative, Passes, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 2010, at A17.  
6 See Cooper & Walsh, supra note 5 (“Analysts fear that at some point—no one knows when—
investors could balk at lending to the weakest states, setting off a crisis that could spread to the stronger 
ones . . . .”).  A similar concern is driving the rescue packages being given to precarious economies in 
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powerful bargaining position to secure a generous federal bailout package 
because that state would know that Congress could not afford to allow a 
default and could not simply mandate state debt repayment.7   
This Essay examines the constitutional implications of a game of 
chicken involving a spendthrift state, and concludes that Congress should 
be given some latitude under the Spending Clause to make a distressed 
state accept a line of credit.8  While the Tenth Amendment protects a 
state’s “right to default” in the sense that Congress cannot order a state to 
raise taxes or cut spending, that principle should not be carried to the point 
where a state can hold the country hostage to get a better loan.9  Instead, 
courts should defer to a congressional act depriving a renegade state of 
other federal funds if it will not accept a rescue package.  This reading of 
the Spending Clause preserves state sovereignty but gives federal officials 
the leverage they need to deal with too-big-to-fail states.10      
II.  A REVERSE UNFUNDED MANDATE 
The best way to understand a prospective default by a large state is that 
it acts as a reverse unfunded mandate.  In a standard unfunded mandate, 
Congress imposes an obligation on state or local governments and makes 
them find the money for those initiatives.11  When a state with crippling 
debts comes looking for a federal bailout, it is essentially trying to foist its 
promises onto the rest of the nation, backed by the threat that the failure to 
provide assistance will cause an economic catastrophe. 
The first predicate for the problem of too-big-to-fail states is that a 
state must be able to make a credible claim that its bankruptcy would pose 
a systemic risk to the financial system.  Rhode Island or Hawaii cannot do 
this.  Consequently, they will be unable to externalize the costs of their 
borrowing.  A small state will default and pay a much higher interest rate 
on its future bonds, or it will be forced to take a federal bailout with 
                                                                                                                          
the European Union, such as Greece and Ireland.  See id. (noting that this type of “turmoil in Europe 
has spread from country to country”). 
7 There is also a moral hazard problem here, as states or private institutions that think they will be 
saved no matter what are more likely to be irresponsible.  This Essay does not address the point, except 
to say that Congress needs some credible way to discipline too-big-to-fail states.  
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207−08 (1987) 
(setting forth the test for the exercise of Spending Clause authority). 
9 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (holding that Congress may not 
commandeer a state legislature).  Arkansas did default on its bonds during the Great Depression, but 
the state did not get a federal bailout and there was no financial crisis as a result.  Mary Williams 
Walsh, Cities in Debt Turn to States, Adding Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1.  
10  Given the ambiguity of the law in this area, Congress could certainly make a plausible threat to 
penalize states that play hardball.  If this Essay makes that threat more credible, then I will be satisfied.  
11 See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 NW. 
U. L. REV. 351, 352−54 (1999) (describing the concept of unfunded mandates). 
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significant strings attached.12  States such as California or Illinois do not 
face this choice.  They can try to haggle for an unconditional loan.  
The second condition that gives some states the power to hold up the 
federal government is that it would be unconstitutional to order them to 
pay their debts.13  Under the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering 
decisions, the Constitution does not “confer upon Congress the ability to 
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”14  It is 
hard to think of a clearer example of federal commandeering than a federal 
statute ordering an unwilling state to keep paying its bonds, as that would 
require direct control of that state’s internal budget decisions.15  
Consequently, large states can resist a stringent federal bailout because 
they cannot be forced to the negotiating table. 
While we can hope that states will not engage in brinkmanship when 
financial conditions are fragile, there are good reasons to think that one 
eventually will.  First, one party may control the state seeking aid and the 
other party may hold the purse strings in Washington, which would tend to 
increase the chance of a standoff.  Second, state politicians will probably 
face harsh retribution from their voters if they make concessions that 
include legal changes, higher taxes, or spending limits dictated by federal 
authorities.  Third, any injury to that state’s credit rating would be 
insignificant if easy federal credit was extended, as that would convince 
future bondholders that lending risks are minimal.  Nevertheless, the nation 
would be harmed (and probably angry) if states were able to get away with 
this opportunistic behavior.  The question is what Congress can do to 
prevent that kind of abuse.    
     
                                                                                                                          
12  The Spending Clause gives Congress broad discretion to attach conditions to the receipt of 
federal funds.  See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207−08 (providing the following limits on the Spending Power: 
(1) the exercise must be in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) Congress’s intent must be unambiguous 
so as to allow states to exercise their choice knowingly; (3) the federal grants must be related to federal 
interest in the project or program; and (4) there must not be an independent constitutional bar to the 
grant of federal funds).   
13 There is the possibility that state bondholders might bring a successful federal takings claim in 
the event of a default, but that would take many years to resolve and hence would not avert a financial 
panic.  
14 New York, 505 U.S. at 162; see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 761−62 (1982) (“[T]his Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to 
promulgate and enforce laws . . . .”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 
288 (1981) (stating that Congress may not take over “the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program”). 
15 The First Congress did assume pre-existing state debts, but as far as I can tell, no state 
government objected to that scheme.  See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 298–300 (2004) 
(describing the Treasury Secretary’s debt assumption plan enacted in 1790).  
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III.  A BAILOUT THEY CAN’T REFUSE  
The search for sticks to bring recalcitrant states into line centers on two 
constitutional provisions: the Guarantee Clause and the Spending Clause.16  
While Congress can claim that a state facing default lacks a republican 
form of government and thus should be put into federal receivership, that 
action would be unprecedented and disproportionate.17  A more modest 
(and practical) solution is for Congress to declare that a large state asking 
for a bailout would face drastic cuts in federal outlays if it refuses to accept 
the terms of an emergency bridge loan.18  Such a fiscal penalty would, in 
my view, be constitutional under the Spending Clause in dire conditions. 
The Guarantee Clause is the only textual authority that Congress can 
wield to eliminate state autonomy, but using that power in a debt crisis 
would be unsound.  Bad government is not unrepublican unless it is akin to 
anarchy.  A state default does not deprive its citizens of fundamental 
liberties or democracy.  Indeed, a choice to suspend debt payments would 
probably be consistent with majority opinion in that state.  Furthermore, 
declaring that a state is no longer entitled to govern itself is a dramatic 
measure that will not increase confidence in a period of economic stress.  
While the threat of using the Guarantee Clause is a tool that Congress can 
use to stake out its negotiating posture on a bailout, savvy state leaders will 
know that this is not a realistic option. 
 Spending reductions for a stubborn state, however, are more tangible 
and politically feasible.  If Congress were to slash education, highway, or 
Medicaid funds for a state, then local officials could not externalize their 
borrowing costs.  More important, these cuts cannot be dismissed as a bluff 
because they can be made binding over the long term.  In other words, 
even if Congress felt the need to extend lavish credit to a reckless state to 
avert a panic, tight spending caps could be imposed afterwards for as long 
as Congress deems necessary to send the message that there is no free 
federal lunch.  This situation should give pause to any state official seeking 
                                                                                                                          
16 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States . . . .”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee Clause, 83 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 26–36 (2008) (exploring the last serious effort to invoke the Guarantee Clause). 
17 Under current doctrine, a decision by Congress to exercise its Guarantee Clause authority is a 
political question and hence not reviewable by courts.  See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S. 118, 143–50 (1912) (discussing the Court’s previous decisions in which it stressed the “inherent 
political character” of a decision by Congress to exercise Guarantee Clause authority). 
Granted, one could analogize a state in default to a bankrupt company or municipality that is put 
under the supervision of a trustee.  But appointing a czar to oversee Pennsylvania, for example, while it 
gets its fiscal house in order would be fraught with political and constitutional problems.  I thank 
Steven Bainbridge for drawing this point to my attention.     
18 The Treasury could not unilaterally withhold appropriated funds or assert that none would be 
appropriated in subsequent years.  
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to ransom the federal treasury, but it would also honor that state’s 
constitutional right to default by leaving the ultimate choice in its hands. 
The only remaining issue is whether this kind of fiscal reprisal is valid 
under the Spending Clause.  Attaching strings to the receipt of federal 
funds is one thing, but providing that a state will forfeit other money if it 
does not accept a federal gift is another.  Nevertheless, courts should defer 
to a congressional decision in this respect.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that there is a germaneness or relatedness limit to the imposition of 
spending conditions by Congress but has refused to define that boundary.19  
In my hypothetical, there would be a link between the bailout and the 
spending cuts, as the latter is the enforcement mechanism for the former.  
This connection might well be insufficient for ordinary legislation, but as a 
solution to the extreme case of a too-big-to-fail problem, such a 
relationship should be adequate.  If not, then the Guarantee Clause presents 
the only means for Congress to rein in bloated states, and forcing Congress 
to exercise its Guarantee Clause authority would do far more harm to our 
constitutional structure. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The best time to start planning for a crisis is not after it starts.  States in 
our federal system that face dramatic budget deficits cannot obtain a 
bailout from the International Monetary Fund—they must go to Congress.  
Thinking through how that kind of rescue request might play out should be 
a top priority in the coming years if we want to avoid a broken 
constitutional order.  
                                                                                                                          
19 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–09 n.3 (1987). 
